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Nepal’s Protracted Democratization in
Terms of Modes of Transition
Since 2005, Nepal has been engaged in a complex political transition. Growing
differences between the radical Maoists and Nepal’s other political parties have
stalemated Nepal’s attempt to complete a durable transition to democracy, a
project intermittently underway since 1950. Yet, significant achievements along
democratic lines have been made. This article applies the modes of transition
approach to analyze Nepal’s various political transitions. Modes of transition
with their emphasis on elite interactions offer a valuable analytical framework
to examine the Nepali case. Nepal’s transitions confirm as well as question
many of the assumptions of this body of scholarship. In the first section, the
paper lays out key theoretical stipulations of the modes of transition; the
second examines Nepal’s transitions, critically applying these key concepts;
finally, the third section presents an assessment of problems and prospects
of consolidating Nepal’s current efforts to achieve a democratic system.

If explaining regime transition is a complex
exercise in general, Nepal’s ongoing transition is
many times more so. Since the mass uprising against
the ousted King Gyanendra in April 2006, Nepal
has achieved several political milestones, including
a Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) with the
Maoists that ended their decade long insurgency, the
Constituent Assembly (CA) elections in April 2008
and the abolition of the 240 year old monarchy in
May 2008. However, the fate of Nepal’s democratic
transition still hangs in the balance as the divide
between the Maoists and Nepal’s other political
parties continues to widen; since April 2006,
political stalemate has become the hallmark of
Nepali politics.
Nepal’s attempt to craft and secure democracy
has been unusually protracted since the country’s
first experience of democracy in the 1950s. Under
the Delhi agreement that the then King Tribhuvan
signed with Nepal’s other political forces, the King
conceded political sovereignty to a popularly elected
Constituent Assembly. However, these stipulations
were shunted aside by King Tribhuvan’s son and
successor, King Mahendra, who reconsolidated royal
primacy through the progressive centralization of
power. The royal coup of December 1960 against

Nepal’s first ever elected parliament marked the
grand finale of King Mahendra’s Machiavellian
maneuvers. For the next thirty years, royal
despotism prevailed albeit punctuated since
the late 1970s with further challenges. In 1990,
King Birendra was forced to accept a multiparty
parliamentary system after a massive and violent
opposition movement to his regime. In April 2006,
Nepal saw another mass uprising against King
Birendra’s brother and successor, King Gyanendra,
who attempted to consolidate his power by openly
breaching the limitations on royal powers under
the 1990 constitution.
How does one explain Nepal’s difficult quest
for democracy and the success and setbacks of
this enterprise? Encumbered by extreme poverty,
illiteracy and a long history of despotic rule, is
Nepal’s political transition likely to produce a
sustainable democracy? Where is the bastion of
Nepal’s democratic aspirations: among the elites,
amonng the changing socio political dynamics
of its people, or with external forces? With these
questions I turn to literature on transition from
authoritarianism for insights and generalizations
that could help explain Nepal’s political transitions.
How helpful are the findings of this body of
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literature to understand the Nepali case?
This paper fills a critical void in the literature on the
democratization process. South Asia has been largely ignored
by scholarship on democratic transitions. One reason for such
neglect could be India’s widely hailed status as the world’s
largest and one of more successful democracies. India’s success
in that sense has overshadowed the continuing struggle by
millions of people in other countries of this region to achieve
democratic governance. This study, I hope, will reveal some
patterns that will contribute also to a wider understanding of
democratization processes.
The first part of this paper provides a brief overview of
the procedural approach to study democratization, and lays
down the basic premises of modes of transition to democracy.
In the second part, the paper applies the central findings of
the modes of transition approach to examine Nepal’s long
drawn out transition to democracy. The third part of the
paper critically examines the problems with and prospects
for the consolidation of a democratic regime in Nepal.

Modes of Transition and Nepal’s
Political Transformation
Literature on the third wave of democratization shows
broad agreement on defining democracy in procedural
terms; this approach is also referred to as democratization
on an “Installment Plan” (Diamond, Linz & Lipset 1995:3).
Nepal’s democratization effort is only conceivable in terms
of what Lynn and Schmitter calls “rejection of the search for
prerequisites” and shifting the focus of analysis to “strategic
choices, shifting alliances, emergent processes and sequential
patterns” in regime changes (Lynn and Schmitter 1991:
270). Democracy under this approach is defined in terms
of minimal procedural conditions rather than substantive
outcomes resembling developed democracies. According to
Dahl, constitutionally vested authority in elected officials,
frequent and fair elections, adult franchise, the right to
run for office, the right to free expression, and the right to
seek alternative sources of information, organizations and
associations are the key conditions of procedural democracy
(1982: 10-11). Others have included secret balloting,
partisan competition, and executive accountability to the list
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 8). Since the late 1980s, the
ability of the opposition to replace the ruling forces has been
seen as a key aspect of the dynamics between and within both
the incumbent and opposition parties. Diamond calls this the
“litmus test of democracy” (Diamond 1996: 25).
If democracy can be understood in terms of procedures,
the role of elites, (both traditional and reformist), emerges as
the key factor in all phases of democratization. Diamond’s
remarks here about the centrality of elites are typical.
He says, “Democratic change is produced not by abstract
historical and structural forces but by individuals and groups
choosing, innovating, and taking risks.” He calls democracy
a “continuum or a process rather than a system that is simply
either present or absent” (Diamond 1999: xi-xii).
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Modes of transition studies are distinctive in their focus
on elite interactions as instrumental in determining the path
of success or failure of transitions to produce democratic
regimes. A Pioneering study of modes of transition from
authoritarianism by O’Donnell and Schmitter found in the
interactions of incumbent and opposition elites clues to
develop a typology of transition, and to make inferences as to
whether the prospects for the consolidation of democracy is
impacted by how transition occurs. Uncertainty of actors and
their strategies is the hallmark of this approach as the actors
are “divided and hesitant about their interests and ideals and,
hence, incapable of coherent collective actions” (O’Donnell
and Schmitter 1986: 4-6). Scholars of modes of transition have
stressed “contingency” of outcomes resulting from “collective
decisions and political interactions” (Lynn, and Schmitter
1991: 271-274). The critical role of elites has been stressed by
several other studies. Bermeo asserts that failure of civilian
elites to “compromise or bargain and abide by the outcome of
the democratic game “endangers democracy”. Democracies,
she says, are “recreated piece by piece, institution by institution
and the creators are usually old enemies” (Bermeo 1992: 27381). Other studies on Latin America and Southern Europe
have even compared the consequences of elite settlements
with “social revolution”; lingering mutual suspicions and
failure to live by democratic rules of the game lead to the
breakdown of democracy (Burton, Gunther and Higely 1992:
5; Cohen 1994: 6-7; Huntington 1996: 8).
Lynn and Schmitter advanced four modes of transition: pact,
imposition, reform and revolution. The level of accommodation
between the old and new elite separated one mode from another.
Pact resulted from compromise; imposition was unilaterally
carried out by incumbents, reform was orchestrated by mass
mobilization and compromise without violence. Revolution
resulted from a complete break with the past and the defeat of
the incumbent elites (Lynn and Schmitter 1991: 275-76). Later
Munck and Leff revisited these modes and realized the need
to look beyond the single dimension of continuity between the
old and new regime to understand the role of various elites.
They thus altered the modes of transition approach by adding
another criterion, the “identity of the primary agents of change.”
They defined transitions as “uniquely fluid processes defined
by the identity of regime challengers and their strategies in
challenging the old regime.” With these modifications, Munck
and Leff expanded the typology by adding categories that
allowed greater discrimination of the role of actors in various
modes of transition. Here is a summary of their modes and
their specifications (1997: 344-46):
1. Reforms from below are driven by pressure from the
outside by broad opposition movements for reform;
however, the incumbent elites still remain powerful
enough to define the parameters of participation. This
mode leads to “restricted democracy.”
2. Reforms through transaction is a “more complicated and
protracted” process. Although it heralds less restricted
democracy, the old elite retain lingering power, which

they use to impose rules that are not “optimal for
democratization.” It also leaves the antiauthoritarian
coalition in disarray. Executive and legislative bodies
are prone to clash in this mode; both governability
and democratic consolidation become problematic.
3. Reforms through extrication lead to “unrestricted
democracy.” The opposition controls this mode of
transition by defeating the old elites. Yet, old elites
due to their reduced but continuing power and
influence (withhold) “lingering power” allowing for a
certain degree of continuity with the old regime. This
modality is considered favorable to a steady progress
toward democratization.
4. Reforms though rupture process is a complete
turnaround, the “most unproblematic type of
transition.” Overtaken by the opposition, the process
leads to unrestricted elections. Under this mode, the
transition is fast and easy but consolidation is not. The
elements of antiauthoritarian coalition disintegrate as
a result of electoral competition. Lacking agreement
on resolution of constitutional issues, consolidation is
eluded by stalemates and standoffs.
5. Reforms through revolution from above are a preemptive
set of reforms initiated by the reform minded ruling
elite; the process is controlled and creates division
and lack of trust among the opposition leaders and
groups.
Bold claims were made about the path dependency of
regimes following these modes of transitions. Lynn and
Schmitter called “transition from above” or pacts, where
the traditional rulers “retain at least part of their power,” as
the most likely to lead to some form of political democracy.
They unequivocally asserted that revolutions were least
likely to lead to “patterns of fair competition, unrestricted
contestation, tolerance for rotation in power and free
associability (Lynn and Schmitter 1991: 280-281).
Modes of transition have since drawn critical reviews.
Studies of East European transitions have found various
assumptions of the modes of transition approach
questionable. For example, McFaul and Bunce find some
of the key observations from earlier studies of transitions
lacking relevance in post-communist transitions. Instead
of continuity with the old regime, the East European cases,
Bunce points out, underline “severing ties” with the old as
more important in building democratic regimes. In sharp
contrast to the assertion of modes of transition approach,
she also found mass mobilization as “proximate and positive
influence” (Bunce 2003: 174-178). McFaul has concluded
that democracy emerged in countries where democrats,
not the traditional elites, had the overwhelming power
and failed where traditional dictatorial elites had decisive
power. He found that equal balance of power resulted
in “unconsolidated, unstable partial democracies and
autocracies” as the protagonists got caught in “protracted
confrontation” (McFaul 2002: 213-214).” In a later work,
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McFaul and Stoner Weiss reaffirm that not “all change is
evolutionarily.” They find that “many of the most important
changes in regime development and economy are rapid and
abrupt” (McFaul and Weiss 2004: 8-9).
The concepts of transition, liberalization and consolidation
are always tied to any discussion of the democratization
process. For O’Donnell and Schmitter “attempts by an
authoritarian regime to modify their rules so as to provide
“more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals
and groups” typically mark the beginning of transition.
O’Donnell and Schmitter also identify uncertainty and
shifting coalitions as essential features of transition process
(1986:4-6). Likewise, for Bunce, transition to democracy
comes to an end with the “formation of the first popularly
elected government” (2003: 179). Shain and Linz define
transition in democratic regime change as “an undefined
period between the launching of the process of dissolution
of an authoritarian regime and the installation of some form
of democracy, or the return to some form of authoritarian
rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative at the
end” (Shain and Linz 1995: 7). Fox, on the basis of his recent
studies of post communist Europe, concludes that “the
conventional notion of political democratization as a single
regime transition should be recast as a set of transitions along
the various key dimensions of democracy.” He points to the
need to study the relationship of “electoral competition”
to factors like “civilian control over the military, effective
universal suffrage, an end to vote fraud, or ending impunity
for state sanctioned violence” (Fox 1994: 184).
As to when transition is to be considered complete, Linz
and Stepan consider it complete when “sufficient agreement
has been reached about political procedures to produce an
elected government, when a government comes to power
that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when
this government de facto has the authority to generate new
policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial
power generated by the new democracy does not have to share
power with other bodies de jure” (1997: 3). These conditions
are highly demanding and their status is often difficult to
determine in view of complex interactions between various
centers of power in new emerging democracies. Marybeth
Peterson Ulrich addresses some of these conceptual problems
in her study Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases
of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces as she underlines the
need to see democratization as a continuum. She identifies the
need to observe several dimensions including “socialization
of the military along democratic lines” and, attainment of
civilian supremacy, which she concludes depends on “a sense
of mutual confidence between military and civilian leaders”
(1999: 17).
The concepts of liberalization and democratization also
relate to the transition process and its aftermath. O’Donnell
and Schmitter point out that the implementation of the
measures to liberalize the regime produces “a multiplier
effect” and prompts greater number of people to exercise new
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freedoms and to challenge the limits of liberalizing regimes
(1986: 7). Liberalization, according to Huntington, “is the
partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing
governmental leaders through freely competitive elections”
(Huntington 1991: 9). Democratization, on the other hand,
requires “open contestation over the right to win control
of government, and this in turn requires free competitive
elections, the results of which determine who governs” (Linz
and Stepan 1997: 3-8).
Consolidation of democracy is the optimum goal of all
democratic transitions. Yet, scholarship is hardly precise in
defining a consolidated democracy. To quote Bunce again,
“consolidation of democracy refers to the degree to which the
key elements of a democratic order are in place, and whether
those elements function to promote effective, inclusive,
and accountable governance”; she defines sustainability
of democracy in terms of the continuation of democratic
rule (Bunce 2003: 179). Linz and Stepan see consolidated
democracy as “a political situation in which, in a phrase,
democracy has become “the only game in town” (1997: 3).
Burton, Gunther and Higley find “dis-unified elites” unable
to agree on even the “basic rules of political conduct” most
inimical to the democratic consolidation process (1992:
3-12). Consolidated democracy has also been defined in
more technical way in terms of the “two-turnover test.” A
democracy passes this test if the party or group that came
to power in the initial election or founding election at the
time of transition (to democracy) loses a subsequent election
and hands over the reins of power to the new winners, and if
these new election winners then peacefully turn over power
to the winners of a later elections (Lijphart 1999: 6-7). For
Diamond, consolidated democracy will require a “shift in
political culture” (1999: 65).

Modes of Transition in Nepal’s Case
How does the preceding literature review help in analyzing
Nepal’s efforts to democratize? Is Nepal’s experience akin to
the transition in Eastern Europe or is it illuminated better with
the modes of transition approach rooted in the experience of
Southern Europe and Latin America? Alternatively, does the
Nepali case show the relevance of the major findings of both
sets of studies? I have divided Nepal’s journey to democracy
into four phases of transitions; 1950-1959; 1979-1981; 199091 and 2005-present. I apply retrospectively, the findings of
modes of transition in terms of the categories developed by
Munck and Leff to Nepal’s first transition.
Nepal’s First Transition 1950-1959: Reform through
Transaction
Nepal’s first breakthrough in democratic rule occurred
in 1950-51 with the flight of then King Tribhuvan to India
in defiance of the Ranas who had ruled Nepal since 1846.
During this period, the Ranas were the defacto rulers
rendering the the King a virtual prisoner in the palace (Joshi
and Rose 1966: 26). The King’s defection from the Ranas
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reflected deep cleavages in the ranks of the traditional elites.
Under the Delhi agreement, negotiated between the three
parties—the King, the Ranas and the Nepali Congress—
under Indian mediation, the King accepted a democratic
system to be established by an elected Constituent Assembly
(CA).
Analysis of Nepal’s first transition process reveals, as
pointed out earlier, both confirmation as well as anomalies
of the modes of transition approach. The category that fits
Delhi agreement most is what Munck and Leff calls reform
through transaction. Bridging the old and the new was central
to the Delhi Accord. The government that immediately
followed the agreement was still led by the Ranas though it
shared power with the representatives of Nepali Congress.
This government was supposed to be an interim government
whose main responsibility was to facilitate the CA elections.
The role of elites was crucial as the agreement was worked
out between the King, the Ranas and Nepali Congress. Soon
after the Delhi agreement it became evident that the King
and his traditional supporters were the primary agents of this
protracted transition; they defined the rules of the game and
undermined the consolidation of democracy.
How about path dependency? Did the Delhi agreement
support the conclusion of the modes of transition approach
that elite interactions determine the path of the subsequent
regime and the level of its success or failure in establishing
democracy? The answer is not resoundingly affirmative.
Instead of living by the pact, traditional elites led by the
King were bent on violating it. Hence, the pact alone fails to
offer a reliable road map for its implementation. The Delhi
agreement seemed to have created an anomalous situation by
tipping the agreement in favor of Nepal’s nascent democratic
forces under Indian influence, making the traditional
elites resent the agreement as an imposition by India. This
factor underlines the critical role of external actors in the
geopolitically vulnerable states, an element that needs greater
recognition and analysis, as it is largely ignored, especially in
the early transition studies.
The agreement also made Nepal’s democratic leaders
vulnerable to the allegation of promoting India’s excessive
influence in Nepal, a factor that was used quite successfully
to marginalize reformist elites, especially those of the Nepali
Congress. The Delhi agreement and its corollary Peace
and Friendship Treaty between India and Nepal negatively
colored Nepal’s self image, which turned into a powerful
factor in shaping future political course. Overwhelming
Indian influence reflected in the Delhi agreement as well as
in the Indian role in subsequent internal political dealings
in Nepal left many Nepalese convinced that India did not
take Nepal’s independence seriously. The period 1950-55
came to be characterized as an era of “special relations” with
India because of excessive Indian meddling in all aspects of
Nepali politics and administration. Opposition to India’s big
brotherly role in Nepali affairs became the rallying cry for
Nepal’s new nationalism, a line promoted by King Mahendra.

Interestingly, both King Tribhuvan and the Nepali Congress
leader B. P. Koirala were rumored to have proposed that
Nepal be integrated into India. Had it not been for Nehru’s
opposition, this rumor claims, nationalist Indian leaders
like Sardar Patel and the Jana Sangh1 leader K. R. Malakani
would have annexed Nepal (BBC Nepali Service, 2007).
Nepal’s communist groups denounced the agreement as a
‘betrayal of their revolution’ (Thapa 2004: 23).
The King used the uncertainty of actors and their strategies
to his advantage. Without much difficulty, the monarch was
able to bypass the provision of popular election to the CA
by having the political leaders agree to his royal draft of a
constitution. The king co-opted opponents of the Nepali
Congress party as his allies in his endeavor (Baral 1977: 2830; Uprety 1993: 20). By the time Nepal’s first parliamentary
elections were held in 1959, the ground rules were all written
at the behest of the King. These elections lacked “rules that
are specifically apriori, explicit, potentially familiar to all
participants and subject to change only according to rules.”
This left the political parties at the mercy of the King. Hence,
Przeworski’s “alienation of control of all actors over outcomes
of conflicts,” which he calls “the essence of democracy” was
lacking in Nepal’s first parliamentary elections (1988: 5658).
The 1959 election results further exacerbated elite
disunity in Nepal. The Nepali Congress’s two thirds majority
in the 1959 elections became its own undoing as it alienated
the other political parties and drove them into the royal camp.
Bermeo’s observation that “democracies usually break down
with the active or passive support of a substantial sector of
the civilian political elite” was so true of the Nepali context
(Bermeo 1992: 276).
The King also benefitted from the fast changing
geopolitical situation culminating in the 1962 Sino-Indian
war. India’s new security imperatives trumped the fate of
Nepal’s democracy as a priority. This allowed the King to
assert his independence from India and further expand the
diplomatic contacts that he had started building. His China
visit in late 1960 had secured a Chinese commitment to
build a 104-kilometer long highway connecting Kathmandu
with Tibet. In 1962, the Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi
warned that in the event of any foreign attack against Nepal,
China would side with the Nepali people. It was interpreted
as a veiled threat to India. The King also befriended India’s
arch enemy Pakistan; Pakistani military leader Ayub Khan
supported the royal takeover. This shift in India’s policy
toward the regime in Nepal came as an early precursor of
what Schmitter and Brouwer found in another context, that
Democracy Promotion and Protection (DPP) has been “a
weapon in the foreign policy arsenal” and DPP gets trumped
by “more pressing foreign policy objectives” (Schmitter &
Brouwer 1999: 4).
Nepal’s case thus raises an important point, that in order
1. The Jana Sangh became the BJP in 1980).
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to be sustained, the democratic blueprint must reflect the
reality of the relative strength of traditional and reformist
elites. Nepal’s first revolution, as Joshi and Rose point out,
was “relatively a very brief episode, but its consequences
were epoch-making for contemporary Nepal “(Joshi and
Rose 1966: 78).” India’s role in Nepali politics echoes
Migdal’s observation that the “role and effectiveness of the
state domestically is highly interdependent with its place in
the world of states (1988: 21).
Nepal’s Second Transition 1979-1981: Reform from
Below
Nepal’s second transition started amidst growing
turbulence for the new King Birendra, who ascended to
the throne in 1972 upon the death of his father. King
Mahendra’s centralized system alienated the opposition as
well as supporters of the regime. Internal squabbling among
the regime leaders over the spoils of power intensified
(Baral 1983: 22). Opposition groups became bolder.
In 1976, the Nepali Congress leaders Bisheshor Prasad
Koirala (B. P.) and Ganesh Man Singh returned from their
exile in India and called for power sharing with the King
(Baral 1983: 29). Koirala warned that if democratic forces
in Nepal remained in a continuing state of weakness, the
influence of pro-Chinese Communists in Nepal would soon
become overwhelming. The opposition to the regime also
grew as education and political awareness raised the level
of discontent and expanded avenues for mobilization and
expression of political discontent. This period consisted of
what Bermeo calls the “critical moment between the crisis of
the old order and the consolidation of the new one” (Bermeo
1992: 273).
King Birendra’s regime confronted a “perceptible rise in
acts of both governmental and popular violence accompanied
by waves of unrest among students and peasants.” In June
1973, a Royal Nepal Airlines plane was hijacked by some
Nepali Congress activists. In September 1974, four men
convicted of possession of hand grenades were executed.
Later that year, a secretariat building burnt down in
Kathmandu amidst suspicion of opposition involvement
(Shah 1990: 10-12). The opposition to the regime culminated
in 1978-79 with widespread protests against the royal
regime on college campuses and streets. In May 1979, amidst
increasing incidents of confrontation between the protestors
and security forces, the King announced his intention to
hold a national referendum subjecting the prevailing system
of restricted, partyless democracy to popular vote, allowing
people to opt if they chose for an alternative multiparty
system. By this move, the King launched Nepali’s second
transition.
Nepal’s second transition fits into Munck and Leff’s first
category reform from below. Unlike the first transition marked
by predominant external influence and marginal role of
opposition forces, “pressure from outside” was pronounced
during this period although the incumbent elites still
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retained sufficient leverage to lead the transition process and
hence restrict full democracy. The role of the mass and civil
society groups marked by organizations of students, labor
unions, professional groups such as lawyers associations,
bureaucracy became increasingly more important in Nepal’s
struggle to leave behind the grip of authoritarian rule.
This transition fundamentally redefined the contours of
Nepali politics. For the first time since the 1950s, media in Nepal
enjoyed unrestricted freedom following the announcement
of the national referendum; this freedom largely continued
even after the no-party system favored by the King secured a
narrow but controversial victory. King Birendra announced
a series of constitutional amendments prior to the holding of
the referendum in May 1980; the amendments included direct
elections for national assembly members, appointment of the
Prime Minster on the recommendation of the legislature,
and collective responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature.
These amendments, in turn, created room for progressive
denudation of royal power and augmented internal tension
by including all the elements of a parliamentary democracy
without its most critical part, the political parties (Shah 1990:
19-20).
Like in the case of the first transition, Nepal’s second
transition also proved protracted, making it imprudent to
limit the period of transition to just the holding of the national
referendum and national elections in 1981. The modes of
transition approach does offer important insights into the
encumbrances that the reformed regime suffered from. The
two concrete outcomes of this transition, the disputed verdict
and constitutional amendments, exacerbated the regime’s lack
of legitimacy, alienating its supporters as well as opponents.
Although the regime won the referendum by securing 55
percent of the votes in favor of the no party system favored by
the king, political parties continued to function albeit without
legal recognition; the press continued relatively unrestrained.
Growing signs of cooperation appeared during this period
between political parties. Along with the Congress Party,
influential communist groups supported multi-party system,
in sharp departure from their earlier policy of pursuing
armed revolution. In fact, it was an early indication of the
inclination of some of the communist groups to play by the
rules of a democratic political system.
In the aftermath of the referendum, two general elections
were held in 1981 and 1986. These elections drew participation
of candidates with clear affiliation to political parties, even
though technically parties remained banned. In the 1981
election, a faction of the Nepali Congress won 4 seats. A
communist faction also participated but failed to win any seat
(Shah 1982: 206-207). All the influential communist groups
boycotted the elections (Shrestha 1990: 19-31). The rank
and file members of Nepali Congress favored participation
as a means to stay in touch with the people and strengthen
the party’s grassroots support (Baral 1983: 5). In the 1986
elections, the Nepali Congress participated at the local level.
Several prominent members of the left affiliated parties were
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elected to parliament (Shramjivi 1992: 43-47). The unraveling
of the royal regime had started with the national referendum
and had continued in its aftermath.
The role of external factors —especially that of India—was
less pronounced in Nepal’s second transition, a significant
departure from the first one. However, one finds India’s role
increasing as the regime moved towards the beginning of
Nepal’s third transition. King’s Birendra’s troubled relations
with India became well known. By mid 1970s, India had
concluded that its policy of restraining the Nepalese opposition
from acting against the royal regime in Nepal had produced
few dividends. In 1975, King Birendra declared Nepal a zone
of peace; India saw it as an anti-Indian posture of the regime.
The royal regime also imported arms from China using the
highway link to Tibet, further alienating India. In 1989,
India refused to renew the transit treaty and closed 13 of the
16 entry points on which Nepal relied for its imports and
exports. The impact of this move was decisive. People had to
stand in line for hours to get their daily necessities like salt,
kerosene etc. India also launched a propaganda drive on its
radio and television against the royal regime in Nepal.
Nepal’s Third Transition 1990-1991: Reform through
Extrication
At the beginning of 1990, fundamental shifts occurred in
both the internal and external factors affecting the state. In
January, the Nepali Congress held its convention and issued
the final call for a peaceful movement for the restoration of
democracy. One of India’s most prominent leaders (and later
Prime Minister), Chandrasekhar, delivered a fiery speech
that worked as “a great source of inspiration” for the Nepali
Congress leaders (Uprety 1993: 127-130). An alliance of
left parties, the United Left Alliance, immediately joined
the Congress’s call to form a Movement for Restoration
of Democracy (MRD). This was the first time ever that the
Nepali Congress had joined hands with the left parties,
seven of whom had come together to form a united front.
The movement captured the aspirations and support of the
new and growing middle class of doctors, lawyers, teachers,
journalists, trade union leaders and industrialists. Even
government employees were sympathetic to the movement
(Sanwal 1993: 202-203). Thus, the identity and strategies of
the political parties had undergone a marked shift from the
first period of transition. Building upon their collaboration
during the national referendum, Nepal’s political parties
were once again ready to work with each other for securing
democratic reforms.
The movement soon gathered unprecedented momentum
and support. On April 6, a massive demonstration took
place in Kathmandu and the crowd later started marching
toward the nearby palace resulting in a confrontation with
security forces causing scores of deaths. Fatalities were also
reported from other parts of the country. On April 19, the
King dismantled the three decade old no-party system and
appointed an 11-member interim government consisting

of the members of protesting parties (Economist April 21,
1990: 36). The formation of the interim government marked
the official beginning of Nepal’s third and by far the most
decisive transition process. With the formation of the interim
government, Nepal quickly settled a question that Shain
and Linz call a “central one” in regime transition: “who
governs between the start of a democratic transition and the
assumption of power by a freely elected government” (Shain
and Linz 1995: 4). This interim government led the country
through the drafting of the 1990 constitution and the holding
of the founding elections in 1991.
How do we characterize Nepal’s third transition? The
modality of reform through extrication does capture major
trends. Each of the major elements of the second transition
(the national referendum and constitutional reforms allowing
direct elections to the National Assembly) had laid the ground
for the King’s decision to accept a multiparty system and
eventually the mode of extrication. Taking place against the
backdrop of popular protests, these reforms were not simply
royal giveaways but also aimed to secure the King’s status
as constitutional monarch. Each of these steps did mark a
substantial break from the past practices; at each juncture the
incumbent elites (hard liners) felt defeated and King Birendra
earned a solid reputation as a reformist King.
The King yielded to the opposition demand for an
unrestricted democracy and the shift of sovereign power
from the king to the people. The role of the masses in this
transition was more critical than ever before. Dozens of
people were reported killed by the security forces before the
King surrendered his power. This unrest against the royal
regime has since come to be known as Nepal’s First People’s
Movement. However, despite these sweeping changes the
King retained some important lingering power that continued
to influence the dynamics of the subsequent regime. This
made Nepal’s third transition an example of reform through
extrication, and not a complete rupture from the old regime.
Unlike the earlier two transitions, democratic reforms
were sweeping and swift. A new constitution was adopted
in November 1990 by the cabinet. The constitution adopted
a multiparty parliamentary system, guaranteed popular
sovereignty and fundamental rights, and included the
independence of the judiciary equipped with the power of
judicial review. As indicated earlier, the constitution did
leave some loopholes that supported lingering powers for
the king. The king remained the Commander-in-Chief of
the Royal Nepalese Army, an institution with unwavering
loyalty to the king. The king also had the power to declare
national emergencies. The constitution was silent on whether
the king needed to consult the government before using the
emergency powers, although it did provide that the House
of Representatives had to approve his exercise of that power
within three months of his doing so (Parajulee 2000: 105108). Nepal’s third transition not only clearly ended with
the general elections in 1991 but also met the stipulations
of consolidation. The founding general elections of 1991
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were followed by two other rounds of national elections in
1994 and 1999. The elections were fiercely competitive; the
Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal-United
Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), emerged as the two leading
contenders. The latter two elections also saw alternation of
power from the incumbent to the opposition. Hence, Nepal
passed both competitive elections and turnover tests.
How far can the regime emerging from the third transition
and its subsequent patterns of operation, the success and
failure, be explained in terms of the factors and interactions
that characterized Nepal’s third transition? Nepal’s third
transition did confirm various stipulations of reform through
extrication. The opposition elites had won a decisive victory
over the royal regime and were the primary force behind the
transition. Also, for the first time, the Nepali political parties
had entered into an interim government of national unity
to govern and to facilitate the writing of the constitution,
a pattern that continues even under the current ongoing
transition. The rules of the game agreed upon by the elites
provided stability to the system and allowed the holding of
three successive elections and alternation of power.
Can the mode of transition explain the subsequent
reversal of the democratic regime that came into being in
1991? The answer here is mixed. Ambiguities left in the 1990
constitution about the exercise of the emergency powers of the
king played a disruptive role. The constitution left the king as
the commander in chief of the military even though the king
was mandated to follow the government’s recommendation
on military matters. These formal provisions shifting the
control of the military to the civilian arena lacked teeth in
view of the failure of civilian leaders to assert their control
over a military that throughout history remained steadfastly
loyal to the palace. A well connected security sector analyst
in Kathmandu told me in December 2007 that leaving the
command and control of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) in the
palace was a blunder on the part of civilian leaders.
Nepal’s new democracy soon encountered severe
challenges and their roots can be traced to the mode of third
transition and the nature of involvement of various parties
in that process. The inter-party and intra-party scramble
for power undermined the stability of the new regime.
Between December 1994 and January 1999, Nepal had six
new governments and five different individuals as Prime
Ministers. Reports of widespread corruption lowered public
trust in the democratic leaders. Elite disunity thus became a
critical element in the weakening of the democratic regime.
The most corrosive factor that undermined the regime
emerging from Nepal’s third transition was the impact
of the radical left. In February 1996, a faction of Nepali
communists (known as the “Maoists”) declared insurgency
against Nepal’s new democracy. Another crucial factor but
coming from outside the 1990-91 transition, was the palace
massacre in June 2001, in which King Birendra along with all
the members of his immediate family lost their lives.
King Gyanendra, who succeeded his brother after the
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palace massacre, revived the rivalry between the palace and
democratic forces. As the new King started outmaneuvering
political leaders, the loyalty of the military to the king and
the raging Maoist insurgency became his chief weapons
to marginalize the political parties. In November 2001,
the beleaguered Nepali Congress government led by Sher
Bahadur Deuba agreed to declare a national emergency
after it failed to negotiate a peace deal with the Maoists, and
after Nepal’s military leaders refused to fight the insurgency
without such a declaration. When emergency was declared, it
sharply divided Nepal’s political parties and emboldened the
new King to consolidate his power. In October 2002, King
Gyanendra dismissed the Prime Minister. Between October
2002 and February 2005, the King hired and fired Prime
Ministers at will. In February 2005, he took direct control
of government; his move was interpreted as another coup
against democratic government, a replay of what his father
had done in December 1960.

The Fourth Transition 2005- present: Reforms
though Rupture
The last and ongoing transition started amidst growing
tension between King Gyanendra and Nepal’s parliamentary
parties leading to reform through rupture. Conflict between
elites is the central factor explaining the rupture. The
King’s moves clearly violated the basic rules of Nepal’s third
transition; the 1990 constitution had clearly made the King
a constitutional monarch despite certain ambiguities in his
powers. The rupture of Nepal’s democratic continuity also
showed both the weakness and strength of Nepal’s political
parties. The political parties remained highly divided in their
response to the king until November 2005 when a historic
agreement was reached to launch a joint struggle against the
King’s move. The role of external actors, especially India and
United States, was also ambiguous. Alarmed by the growing
power of the Maoist insurgency, external powers had paid
little attention to the demands of political parties until they
realized that the King’s despotic regime had no chance of
defeating the insurgency either.
What forced the King to relinquish his power? The
unity of oppositional leaders emerges as the most important
factor. Nepal’s opposition parties, pushed around by an
uncompromising King, reached out to the Maoists. In
November 2005 Nepal’s Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the
insurgent Maoists, with the blessing of India, reached a twelvepoint letter of understanding in New Delhi. The Maoists
pledged to join the other political parties in their campaign
to restore Nepal’s stalled democratic process. In return, the
SPA leaders accepted the long-standing Maoist demand for
Constituent Assembly elections. The understanding also
included provisions for including the Maoists in the interim
government and a commitment on the part of the Maoists to
respect the democratic process and return the properties they
had illegally seized. This was the first commitment on the
part of the Nepali Maoists to join the democratic mainstream.
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The twelve-point agreement marked the beginning of the end
of monarchy. The King had no role in this new partnership
between Nepal’s mainstream political parties and the
Maoists.
The Delhi understanding became the basis of the most
sweeping regime transformation marking a complete break
from the past. The end of the royal regime came sooner than
anyone had expected. The SPA parties, with the support of
the Maoists, started the April movement as a strike call in
the Kathmandu valley from April 6-9, 2006. The opposition
campaign continued till April 25 when the king restored
the House of Representatives dissolved since May 2002
and surrendered the executive powers to the SPA leaders.
Nepal’s newly empowered leaders completely sidelined the
King through a series of declarations that changed the name
of the Royal Nepal Army to Nepal Army and His Majesty’s
government to Nepal Government. Laws were also passed to
impose taxes on the king and limit his compensation. On
May 29, 2008 Nepal became the newest republican state by
abolishing the monarchy.
Uncertainty has defined the position of internal as well as
external actors. Internally, the King’s moves to reconsolidate
his power were perhaps guided by certain hopes of success.
This could have been based on the evident lack of oppositional
unity against the king. The Nepali Congress and Nepal’s
parliamentary communist parties remained divided until
close to November 2005 over their understanding of the role
of the monarchy, with the former supporting a constitutional
monarchy and the latter favoring a republic. Their repeated
effort to persuade foreign powers to exert greater pressure on
the King to accommodate them had failed. Their overtures to
the Maoists for ending insurgency and forging common front
had either been dismissed or elicited an uncertain response.
The King expected to win public support through various
measures to provide greater security and transparency in
government. The King also showed overconfidence in the
ability of his security forces to defeat or contain the Maoist
insurgency.
The international response to the King’s usurpation of
power before his February 2005 coup was also muted. India
continued to insist on its twin pillar policy of supporting
constitutional monarchy and democracy in Nepal adopted since
the 1990. However¸ King Gyanendra’s refusal to accommodate
the democratic leaders and his regime’s inability to make any
headway in fighting the insurgency opened a schism in India’s
policy. India’s security establishment along with the centrist
and right wing forces wanted to continue fighting the Maoists
by beefing up the Nepali army. The Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh favored this line by seeking a compromise
between the King and the political parties to strengthen the
fight against the Maoists but the King was not receptive. King
Gyanendra further alienated India by reaching out to China
for arms and by insisting at the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in November 2005
on giving China either regular membership or observer status

in the SAARC; New Delhi saw this as an attempt by Nepal
and Pakistan to undercut India’s regional role in the region
(Srivastava 2005).
The massive popular uprising against the King in the
Nepali capital and other parts of the country was largely
unanticipated. The role of the masses ,therefore, became
the decisive element in this transition although the initial
momentum was provided by the elite compromise reached
through the Delhi understanding. For the first time,
the protestors included a large number of government
bureaucrats. Neither India nor the United States seemed to
have accurately gauged the fast developing situation in Nepal.
The peace process that India had helped start in November
2005 was moving well beyond New Delhi’s ability to manage.
India was not alone in misreading the situation; the American
Ambassador, James. F. Moriarty, had mistakenly concluded
that the King could survive by acting promptly to compromise
with the opposition (CNN April 21, 2006).

Prospects for consolidation and
conclusions
As envisaged by reform through rupture, the nature of
the changes that have taken place in Nepal is sweeping. The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the
SPA and the Maoists in November 2006 was a land mark in
terms of laying a path for mainstreaming the Maoists. The CPA
led to the involvement of the United Nations in monitoring
the Maoists’ weapons and combatants. The successful CA
elections in April 2008 and the declaration of the republic in
May 2008 are two other major achievements of the post-April
2006 period. The elimination of the monarchy from the basic
political dynamics of Nepal has removed a principal hurdle
in Nepal’s democratization process. Nepal’s latest transition
has also broadened participation from different ethnic
and minority groups, including women and traditionally
marginalized Madhesi, Dalits and indigenous groups, thereby
significantly increasing the number of stakeholders in the
political process.
Nepal’s electoral arena, as evidenced by the CA election
results, has become even more competitive. While the
Maoists emerged as the largest party in the CA with 220
seats, it could only form a coalition with the support of other
parties. Although the electoral performance of the hitherto
two leading parties of the Seven Party Alliance, the Nepali
Congress and the CPN-UML, was dismal, they still command
considerable political leverage as the second and third largest
parties. The Tarai based parties, the Madhesi People’s Rights
Forum (MPRF) and the Tarai Madhesh Loktantrik Party
(TMLP), emerged as the fourth and fifth largest parties in the
CA. Unlike the Maoist sweep of the hilly regions, the Tarai
parties presented an effective challenge to the Maoists as well
as to other parties in the Tarai.
As envisaged by the rupture mode of transition, the
progress of Nepal’s transition has been hampered by various
factors, leaving the prospects for consolidation of democracy
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highly uncertain. The CA elections have made the SPA parties
and the Maoists preoccupied with their electoral prospects.
Since the CA elections, cooperation between the major
political parties, especially between the Maoists and others,
has been difficult, leading to stalemate, confrontation and
political instability.
In Nepal’s case, one finds validity of both earlier and later
experiences of transition from authoritarian rule. Nepal’s
fourth transition also involved incorporating the insurgent
Maoists, who continue to espouse a radical ideology and
are backed by organized cadres and militia. O’Donnell and
Schmitter’s clear determination of the unlikely consolidation
of democracy in situations where the radical political forces
hold sway does appear relevant to explaining the divide
between the Maoists and other political forces. Repeated
assertion by the Maoist leaders of their ultimate objective
of capturing the state and completing their revolution has
deepened the political divide.
Moreover, the Maoist demand for the integration into
the Nepal Army of thousands of their combatants currently
housed in cantonments has caused serious rift between the
Maoists and the military, which finds support for its position
from most of the non-Maoist political parties. The Nepali
army as well as Nepal’s other political parties see the Moaist
demand as a ploy to undermine the army and undermine
the Nepali state with a view to eventually stage a Maoist
takeover.
The Maoists’ role in Nepal’s latest transition has also been
very transformative. This contradicts earlier assertions in the
modes of transition literature that radical forces are always
counterproductive as far as the emergence of a democratic
regime is concerned. It is undeniable that the Maoists of
Nepal played a critical role in the success of the April 2006
movement. The Maoists also launched an unequivocal
campaign for the abolition of monarchy and the declaration
of a republic along with their persistent demand for CA
elections. Nepal’s other political parties followed the Maoists
lead on these critical issues.
The Maoists are not only aware of their instrumental role
in Nepal’s political transformation but are also committed to
outsmarting the other political parties. Distrust between the
Maoists and other parties have grown wider as the Maoists
have violated the terms of the peace accord and sought power
by any means possible including violence and extortion. The
Maoists’ winning of the largest number of seats in the CA
elections further boosted their confidence to pursue a radical
agenda.
The Maoists, in their quest to advance their interests,
have disregarded past agreements and understandings. This
has undermined their ability to win over and hold on to
partners. This allowed the Nepali Congress-led coalition to
stay in power till August 2008, four months after the April
CA elections. The Maoists’ policy of brinkmanship also
led to their ouster from power in May 2009. The Maoists
resigned over their failed attempt to sack the Chief of Army

Nepal’s Protracted Democratization/K antha

Staff, Rukumgat Katuwal; the move was opposed by most of
Nepal’s other political parties and external powers including
India. The cabinet order sacking Mr. Katuwal was annulled
through a presidential decree allowing the COAS to continue
in his office. The non-Maoist forces saw the Maoist attempt to
remove the COAS as an attempt to speed up the integration of
Maoist combatants into the army.
Nepal’s attempt to integrate the radical forces of a
decade long Maoist insurgency without having made a
successful institutional transformation from its authoritarian
past makes Nepal’s political transition truly unique, and
therefore not fitting precisely into any of the existing
modes of transition. Yet, with the Maoists commitment to
democratic politics continually under doubt, Nepal’s politics
has become increasingly polarized between the Maoists and
those supporting the building of a democratic Nepali state.
This polarization has both positive and negative impacts. On
the plus side, it has created greater unity among non-Maoist
groups; more than 20 parties are supporting the current
coalition that replaced the Maoists. This has raised underlined
the need for the Maoists to compromise and play by commonly
agreed rules. On the negative side, it has undermined the
ability of democratic forces to govern and to complete the task
of writing the constitution. Without the cooperation of the
Maoists, the political process in Nepal will remain stalemated
and conflictual. Moreover, the Maoists’ continued reliance on
protest politics as well as violence, and its continued threat to
usurp power through street protests has pushed Nepal’s other
political parties into increasing reliance on the military as an
insurance against the feared Maoist attempt to overwhelm
the state. The row over the COAS Katuwal’s sacking clearly
manifested this phenomenon. Perhaps the only element that
could lead Nepal’s current transition process to success is the
broad unity between Nepal’s internal political forces and the
backing of external powers to non-Maoist forces to keep the
Maoists from overwhelming Nepal’s other political forces and
taking over the state. Whether this will eventually succeed
in consolidating democracy or renew conflict and civil war
remains to be seen.
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